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Abstract 
 
This paper deals with the commitment to provide justice to all people that 
emperor Justinian (483-565 AD) expressed in his Codex Iustinianus, which was 
part of  his codification that provided an extensive restatement of the late Roman 
law. The paper focuses on how this commitment to provide justice to the people 
through this codification became apparent. In doing this, it becomes clear that 
Justinian’s conception of what justice was is closely linked to the strong 
stratification of society that was prevalent in his time. The paper thus tries to 
define what this definition of justice entailed, and what threats to the providing of 
justice through this codification can be identified in this law. This will then be 
used to show how the providing of justice for all was envisaged in late antique 
society, and also what other interests were at stake in the maintenance of this 
imperial law. 
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List of abbreviations 
 
The abbreviations used here are related to the different parts of the Corpus Iuris 
Civilis. These are: 
 
C. =     Codex Iustinianus 
 
C. Haec =  Constitutio Haec (...), translated by Blume as: 
“Concerning the Composition of a New Code” (part of the 
preliminary remarks to the first edition of the Codex) 
 
C. Summa = Constitutio Summa (...), translated by Blume as: 
“Concerning the Confirmation of the Justinian Code” 
(part of the preliminary remarks to the first edition of 
the Codex) 
 
C. Cordi =  Constitutio Cordi (..,) translated by Blume as: 
“Concerning the correction of the Justinian Code and the 
second edition thereof” (part of the preliminary remarks 
to the second edition of the Codex) 
 
D. =    Digestae 
 
Deo Auctore =   refers to the first part of the preliminary remarks to 
the Digestae, whose title is translated by Watson as 
“The Composition of the Digest”  
 
N. =    Novellae 
 
In addition one other abbreviation is used that refers to a different source: 
 
C.Th.    Codex Theodosianus 
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Introduction 
 
The emperor in late antiquity must have been an enigmatic figure. Enjoying an 
almost divine status as the most powerful man in as vast an empire as his, he 
simultaneously cared to express his concern with the humblest of citizens and let 
them have a direct way of access to his legal authority by their right to file 
petitions to him. In this way these people were provided with a way of obtaining 
a definite statement of what the law on a certain topic proscribed from the 
emperor as the highest legislator and judge, without any costs.  
The great power that the late Roman emperor enjoyed has been subject of 
numerous studies, as has his relationship with the law. In these studies a trend 
can be discerned that emphasizes the centrality of the citizen in the conception 
and making of the law of late antiquity. Law and citizenship were inextricably 
linked in this time as only citizens had access to the law. But there were various 
other ways in which the law evolved around citizens too, as has been described 
by Harries and Humfress. The latter writes that “the administration of justice was 
built on the principle that an individual with a ‘right’ (ius) should have a remedy i.e., the 
ability to pursue that claim through some kind of formalised process.”1 The citizen’s legal 
rights and obligations, in particular those concerning property and personal 
security, were at the core of the Roman law, which was thus proudly called ius 
civile. This was contrasted with the more general ius gentium, the law of all 
peoples, which could be equated with natural law.2   
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Humfress 2013 (II), p. 234. See, generally, Garnsey 2006 on the connection between citizenship 
and the enforcement of the law.  
2 Harries 2013, pp. 46-7.  
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The emperor appropriated an absolute form of constitutional power in this 
period. However, he also recognized that it was in his own interest to support this 
centrality of the citizen in the law in order to ensure the continuing approval of 
his people to be bound by it and thus their acknowledgement of its authority. 
Naturally, this also entailed respect for the rights that the law granted these 
citizens, and to express this the emperor would present himself as being 
personally subject to it as a first citizen or “citizen-emperor.”3 He would also 
express repeatedly how committed he was to serving the common good through 
his legislative and adjudicative activities, and would even state that it was his 
duty to legislate for the common benefit.4 One of the ways in which the emperor 
fulfilled this duty was through joining a conversation with citizens via answering 
their petitions, on which Connolly has written an extensive study.5  
These answers together formed a body of law that thus developed bottom-up. 
Such a view on late antique law, that can be contrasted with views that argue for 
this law as a centralised imperial undertaking, is supported by Humfress in 
several articles. She refers for instance to the fact that property laws were not 
formed in the capital cities, but along specific contexts and amongst various 
actors.6  
The central place of the citizen in the law also meant that the actual enforcement 
of the law was primarily initiated by citizens and not by the state. In this sense 
there was a kind of “self-help justice,” justice that was done or provided for upon 
request by its subjects. For “(w)hile the state (...) had a duty to enforce the outcome of 
disputes referred to the adjudication of its magistrates, neither enforcement nor policing were 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 Harries 2013, p. 50 and 59.  
4 Humfress 2013 (II), p. 226.  
5 Harries 2013, p. 60. See Connolly 2010.	  	  
6 Humfress 2013 (II), p. 228. For another article from Humfress that touches on this, see Humfress  
2007. See also Bryen 2012, pp. 809-10. 
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central to Roman concepts of how law worked or what it was for.”7 This seems to imply 
that also the protection of weaker parties by the law or their access to justice was 
not a given, but only provided for in the specific situations that were addressed in 
the petitions sent to the emperor.  
While these arguments for the centrality of the citizen in the late antique law 
sound convincing, surely other interests must have been at play too in the 
development and maintenance of the law in the late antique period. The  emperor 
and members of the imperial bureaucracy must have had an interest in the law 
and its articulation to keep control over the empire, to regulate relations between 
people and give rules on court procedures, to name some examples. There were 
certain types of imperial law that served these goals, like the edicta that were 
issued in the Republic and early empire by praetores (urban prefects) to 
supplement the ius civile. It must thus be assumed that both the citizens and the 
emperor had an interest in the maintenance of the law.  
How the law exactly served the emperor and his offices is not completely certain, 
but we do know that the law served his interests through granting high status and 
special privileges to people working as part of the imperial bureaucracy. Just as 
well, the law limited the power of groups without official duties. In a society 
where social status was for an important part derived from official positions and 
their ranking, the law thus recognized and even fixed some of the differences in 
power that this society was permeated by. In this light, the question comes to 
mind how serving the emperor’s interest in upholding the state by granting people 
different statuses and amounts of power could co-exist with the notion of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7 Harries 2013, p. 46.  
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centrality of the citizen in the law, which was concerned with serving its subjects 
as an instrument for obtaining justice.  
As a source to researching this contradiction the Corpus Iuris Civilis could be used, 
which was promulgated between 529 and 534 AD by emperor Justinian (483-565 
AD.) Justinian presented his codification – and especially the Codex Iustinianus, 
which was to serve as a collection of all relevant imperial rescripts that had been 
promulgated under his predecessors – as a sea change compared to previous 
bodies of law. For Justinian claimed that his code offered clarity where the law 
had been obscure and uncertain before. Such claims, in combination with the fact 
that this codification has almost completely survived until this day, make that the 
Corpus very well lends itself for assessing how the emperor expressed his 
commitment to providing justice to its citizens through the rendering of a new, 
definite code, and what, if any, this commitment meant in terms of concrete 
actions regarding his position of legislator.  
 
The purpose of this paper will therefore be to evaluate how the emperor’s claim of 
his commitment with providing justice to all people under his jurisdiction was 
explicitly phrased in the Codex and how this providing of justice related to the 
stratification that characterized society. In order to do this, the argument will be 
divided into three different parts. The first chapter explores the precise dimension 
of Justinian’s commitment to providing justice to his imperial subjects by 
analysing his own words about the creation of his Corpus, in particular the 
Codex, and the innovations that this codification brought to the administration of 
justice in the empire. From this chapter it will become clear that his commitment 
to the provision of justice lay mainly in the delivering of a definite statement of 
	   8	  
what the law was and to abandon the confusion that the law had long been 
surrounded with. This will be followed by a chapter on how Justinian’s 
codification treated differences in power between groups in late antique society. 
This chapter will show that the providing of justice “for all people” did not mean 
application of the same rules to all, but rather supplying every group with the 
kind of justice that was deemed fit. The last chapter will then focus on which 
potential threats to the providing of justice were identified and provided for by 
this codification, showing that a concern for the upholding of the role of exclusive 
legislator, and with that the role of provider of justice, was also apparent in the 
law, and that measures were taken to abandon the threats to this role that had 
appeared in the courtroom and other areas of society.  
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Chapter 1: How did Justinian’s commitment to providing justice to 
the people under the jurisdiction of his law become apparent? 
 
Introduction 
One of the characteristics of late antique society is its increased verticalization.8 In 
this society the emperor ruled as an absolute monarch as he personally appointed 
most of the officials, declared war and decided on taxes. He also played a very 
important role in jurisdiction: he served as a court of appeal against the 
judgements of magistrates below him, but also as a judge of first instance in 
criminal and civil cases.9 And though he was bound by the law himself,10 the 
emperor was also the supreme source of law: “(a) decision given by the emperor has 
the force of a statute. This is because the populace commits to him and into him its own 
entire authority and power.”11  
There were  different ways in which the emperor could present justice as a gift to 
his people. Next to responding to petitions of individuals by means of rescripts, 
which, it has been argued by others, might serve as the base for a more general 
ruling by the same emperor, he could for example grant amnesty in criminal cases 
and dispense legal privileges and exemptions to individual petitioners.12   
The role of the emperor was thus closely linked to the providing and upholding of 
the legal system in the late empire. Several emperors added to this role by 
promulgating their own codifications, and Justinian was one of them. But 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8	  Marcone	  1997,	  p.	  352.	  	  
9	  Matthews	  2000,	  p.	  13.	  	  
10	  Haldon	  identifies	  this	  as	  a	  typically	  Christian	  notion	  which	  distinguishes	  Justinian	  from	  emperors	  in	  the	  classical	  period,	  see	  Haldon	  1997,	  p.	  26.	  	  
11	  D.1.4.1.	  See	  also	  Jones	  1966,	  p.	  121.	  	  
12	  Humfress	  2013	  (I),	  p.	  83	  and	  Millar	  1983,	  p.	  76-­‐77.	  Note	  how	  Millar	  writes	  that	  these	  functions	  of	  the	  emperor	  could	  sometimes	  contradict	  each	  other:	  for	  the	  individual	  benefits	  granted	  by	  the	  emperor	  could	  undermine	  the	  validity	  of	  a	  general	  rule	  also	  given	  by	  him.	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Justinian’s code stood out from these codifications, most particularly because of 
the rigour with which it restated the whole existing law. And what is also of great 
importance here is that it has survived as a whole and provides us with plenty of 
evidence on Justinian’s concern with the provision of justice.    
The articulation of this aim becomes apparent in several ways: it is stated literally, 
but can also implicitly be derived from the way in which this undertaking of the 
restatement of the law was executed and the exclusive status it was given. All 
aspects of this codification that show Justinian’s commitment to justice will be 
explored here.   
 
The Corpus Iuris Civilis 
Justinian is commonly described as an emperor with a particularly dominating 
personality, but also as one who used his power to initiate reforms for the 
common good, his restructuring of the Roman law being an outstanding example 
of this.13 This was also the image that he wanted to propagate amongst his people, 
as will become clear below. The great importance of the law for the welfare and 
maintenance of the state could not be doubted for Justinian, who proclaimed that 
the “(s)upreme protection of the state rest(s) upon two props, arms and the laws, and 
insuring its vitality through these sources, the fortunate Roman race has brought it about 
that it is preeminent above all nations and that is has dominated all in the past as, with the 
aid of a propitious God, it will do in the future.”14 This passage shows how Justinian 
thought of the law as having the function of ensuring Roman predominance, and 
how he thought peace was preserved within the boundaries of the empire through 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13 Jones 1966, p. 104 and 135, Pazderink p. 191 and Haldon 1997, p. 17. See Jones 1964, pp. 279–
282 for Justinian’s administrative reforms in general.  
14	  C.	  Summa.	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the use of force and the law.15 For after his military triumph abroad Justinian 
decided to focus on internal affairs to ensure harmony within the borders with 
help of the law.16 
Justinian started his undertaking of restating the law very soon after he became 
emperor. It was an impressive project that started in 527 AD, only to be 
completed in 565 AD. This Corpus Iuris Civilis consists of parts that differ in nature 
but complement each other in Justinian’s pursuit of codify all relevant Roman 
law. According to Matthews it can roughly be stated that to the late Roman 
understanding of law two categories of source material can be found in the 
Corpus: it contained ius, or law as an interpretative discipline, which was based 
on the published works of the legal writers of the Classical period, and leges, the 
primary legal texts themselves.17 This latter category concerned for example the 
imperial constitutions that had been issued over time, and new laws issued by the 
emperor. They did not contain critical comment in the way ius did (though it can 
be stated that some form of implicit commentary could be found in the selection 
of this imperial legislation that was included in Justinian’s collection.) Both 
categories of law were present in Justinian’s code.   
 
The different parts that made up the Corpus, and that all in their own way 
contributed to Justinian’s ambition to restate the whole law, will be touched upon 
now. The first component of the Corpus existed of leges: it was the Codex 
Iustinianus (529 AD), a collection of all imperial legislation from Diocletian (284-
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
15 See also Pazdernik 2005, p. 198.  
16 C. Summa and Pazdernik 2005, p. 198. See also Deo auctore.   
17	  Matthews	  2000,	  p.	  11.	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305 AD) until Justinian’s reign.18 Part of this work provides for example the 
provisions for litigating according to the rules at that time, like a modern-day civil 
code, and another big part is dedicated to the description of public offices and 
what authority each office had. The imperial legislation collected here had 
originally come in the form of rescripts. These were answers of the emperor to 
queries from judges who were uncertain of the law and asked for an imperial 
ruling, and to petitions from individuals who wished to know what the law was 
before they would commence litigation.19 The practice of rescripts was very 
common in the third and fourth centuries. After that they fell out of favour as 
sources of law, but Justinian restored their authority.20 
In addition to the Codex new constitutions or Novellae (also known as 
Constitutiones) were promulgated as supplements to this reworking of the existing 
law. They were instigated by Justinian but partly derived from the official 
collections of Novellae from that of Theodosius (447) onwards, and from 
individual constitutions of eastern emperors. 21  Justinian would continue to 
promulgate these Novellae throughout his reign. As a source of imperial 
legislation these would thus also fall into the previously mentioned category of 
leges. 
 
After the promulgation of the Codex as the definite establishment of the existing 
imperial law Justinian set out to have the vast body of classical juristic writings 
clarified. These writings had appeared over a long period of time and often 
contradicted each other. They thus continued to form a source of confusion next 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
18	  C.	  Summa	  and	  C.	  Summa	  1.	  	  
19	  Jones	  1966,	  p.	  182.	  See	  C.1.19	  on	  the	  general	  regulations	  concerning	  petitioning	  to	  the	  emperor,	  which	  includes	  rescripts.	  See	  also	  C.1.23.	  	  
20	  Jones	  1966,	  p.	  182.	  See	  also	  Connolly	  2010,	  pp.	  23-­‐27.	  	  
21 Humfress 2005, p. 164.  
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to the now clarified collection of imperial constitutions that the Codex was. 
Justinian was not the first emperor to recognize these juristic writings as a source 
of uncertainty that had to be tackled: Constantine, Valentian III and Theodosius 
II had already tried to fix the use of these writings in court proceedings before 
him.22 Justinian aimed to surpass them in this and set out to first settle the fifty 
most urgent legal disputes within these legal writings through his proclamation of 
the Quinquaginta Decisiones (Fifty Decisions).23 These have not survived as an 
independent work of law but a certain amount of them probably appeared as 
rescripts in the second version of the Codex. 24  Then, the collection and 
harmonization of all existing writings by prominent legal scholars was started, 
which became the Digestae (or Pandectae) and was promulgated in 53325  
The last part of the Corpus that Justinian ordered was that of the Institutes, which 
were meant as a guide of legal principles for law students and were constituted 
simultaneously with the Digestae. 26  The Institutes would become a large 
influence on several of the civil codes of today, but they play less important a role 
in Justinian’s commitment to providing justice, as this commitment was most 
clearly expressed in the Codex and the Digestae, and in some of the Novels too.27  
Both these Institutes and the Digestae are interpretative texts, or ius. And though 
the distinction between leges and ius serves to show how the sources of the Corpus 
differed in nature, it is less relevant in regard to the validity of the whole Corpus 
as a body of law, for Justinian declared that any part of  the Corpus, whatever its 
origin, was now to be regarded as universal law. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
22	  Humfress	  2005,	  p.	  165.	  
23	  See,	  e.g.,	  C.1.17.2.	  
24	  Watson,	  p.	  xiii.	  Otherwise	  the	  Fifty	  Decisions	  were	  overhauled	  by	  the	  second	  edition	  of	  the	  Codex.	  C.	  Cordi	  5.	  	  
25 C. Cordi 1.  
26 C. Cordi 1 and Garnsey and Humfress 2001, p. 53.  
27 Watson, p. xiii. See also C.1.17.1.11.  
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In 534 AD a second version of the Codex was promulgated which integrated the 
new legislation issued by Justinian and superseded the first one, and in his 
striving to maintain a law that reflected the actualities of its day he would 
continue to order Novellae when necessary.28 His plan to collect and promulgate 
the Novellae that were issued between 534 and 554 was however never realized, 
and those dating from after 534 only survived through private collections.29 The 
revised version of the Corpus 534 that includes the Novellae constituted between 
529 and 534 is the version that is most commonly used today in studies of the 
Corpus.30 
 
This outline of the components of Justinian’s Corpus tells us different things 
about its nature. First of all, it shows us how vast a project the composing of the 
Corpus was. This was done by a committee of carefully selected jurists and high 
officials, though Justinian stressed his own involvement in their work.31 Also, 
these different components show us how varied the law was in nature, and how 
all these writings on what the law comprised were now put together in one neatly 
arranged work. This must have been a very considerable advancement in the 
practicality of the law given the state that it  - if one can indeed speak of ‘the law’ 
– was in before. It also shows us how varied the law’s sources were, some coming 
from the mouth of the emperor, some of highly-regarded legal scholars. But at the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
28 C. Cordi 4.  
29 Humfress 2005, p. 164 and Kearley 2010, p. 379.  
30 Corcoran argues that this is due to the fact that the majority of scholars rely on the now 
standard 1877 edition of the Codex by P. Krüger, which is based on the 534 edition. However, 
there exists source material in form of fragments of the first edition. See Corcoran 2009 (I) and 
also Corcoran 2009 (II).   
31	  C.	  Haec	  1	  and	  C.	  Summa	  1	  and	  2.	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same time these different kinds of law had all been developed in response to a 
need for a statement on what the law was in a certain situation.  
Justinian’s Corpus is an impressive work. This will even become clearer when 
contrasted with the preceding bodies of law of the late empire. 
 
The predecessors of the Corpus Iuris Civilis  
Before Justinian’s reign different collections of laws had been constituted, and 
other sources of law, like juristic writings, were commonly used next to them. 
Justinian expresses that these sources of law caused confusion as they were 
scattered and would also be in conflict with each other. They therefore no longer 
served the common good by providing protection like the law is supposed to do, 
he argued:  
“Whereas, then, nothing in any sphere is found so worthy of study as the authority of law, which 
sets in good order affairs both divine and human and casts out all injustice, yet we have found the 
whole extent of our laws which has come down form the foundation of the city of Rome and the days 
of Romulus to be so confused that it extends to an inordinate length and is beyond the 
comprehension of any human nature. It has been our primary endeavour to make a beginning with 
the most revered emperors of earlier times, to free their constitutiones (enactments) from faults and 
set them out in a clear fashion, so that they might be collected together in one Codex, and that they 
might afford to all mankind the ready protection of their own integrity, purged of all unnecessary 
repetition and most harmful disagreement.’’32  
 
Emperors before him had recognised this too, but had not stood up to the 
challenge:  
“(W)e have determined, with the help of God, now to make a present, for the common 
good, of what appeared to many past emperors to require improvement, but which none of 
them, in the meantime, ventured to put into effect.”33  
 
What follows from the two citations above is that Justinian claimed that 
something as important as the law can not be left in the state that he found it in, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
32 Deo Auctore 1.   
33	  C.	  Haec.	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and that he found himself to have the task to clear it up, thus serving the benefit 
of all those who were subject to it. In doing this, he aimed to clearly distinguish 
his Corpus from previous codifications and underpin his superiority as an 
emperor for his thoroughness by showing how he had perfected the task of 
updating the law that others had failed.  
In this undertaking of newly establishing the law these preceding collections of 
imperial constitutions and authoritative juristic writings were however used as 
source material.34 The predecessors in question were the Codex Theodosianus (429-
438), which will receive some attention below, and the Codex Gregorianus (291 
AD) and Codex Hermogenianus (295 AD), the two earliest known collections of 
rescripts that each had been issued by a magister libellorum (called Gregorianus and 
Hermogenianus) between 196-291 and 293-294 and were considered to bear 
official status for several reasons.35 Both survived through their adaption by 
Justinian’s Codex.36 
Just like that of Justinian, these previous collections of law were named “codex”, 
which refers to the particularity that they were bound as volumes, and therefore 
significantly easier in use than the traditional rolls when one searched them for a 
certain passage.37 There are more qualities that added to the practicality of their 
use, like the division of the texts into books and subject-headings or titles 
(Gregorianus) or only titles (Hermogenianus), and Gregorian’s choice to 
rearrange the collected rescripts from chronological order into topics. It is also 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
34 C. Haec and C. Summa. 
35 Harries 1999, p. 21 and Connolly 2010, p. 39 and 41.  
36 Humfress 2005, pp. 163-164. 
37 Oxford Classical Dictionary, under ‘codex’. 
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presumed that both codices only mention a selection of the most important 
rescripts and that the rest was disposed of.38  
The Codex Gregorianus and Hermogenianus thus served as practical tools in 
finding out what the imperial rescripts proscribed for the situations they covered, 
and were indeed widely used. But what did not add to their practicality was the 
fact that it was permitted to cite imperial laws that were outside of these 
collections.39 This formed a considerable contrast with Justinian’s codex, which 
was characterized by its aim to give a definite manifestation of the law, as will be 
elaborated on below. The Codex Theodosianus, which was promulgated after the 
Gregorianus and Hermogenianus, was ordered as an exclusive and 
chronologically ordered collection of all the general laws that had been 
proclaimed from the time of Constantine (beginning of the 4th century), but this 
codex too was less rigorous than Justinian’s in its striving to be an authoritative 
statement of the law.40  
These assertions relate to two key features of Justinian’s Corpus that will now be 
given more attention, which are its practicality and exclusivity. As will be argued 
later, these elements also played an important role in the way in which Justinian 
claimed that his Corpus, and especially the Codex, would provide justice to the 
people. 
 
A practical instrument  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
38 Connolly 2010, p. 40.  
39 Oxford Classical Dictionary, under ‘codex’. 
40 Harries 1999, p. 22 and Oxford Classical Dictionary, under ‘codex’. 
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It has already been mentioned that the existing law was found so confusing that 
Justinian deemed promulgating a new body of law necessary. 41  Hence the 
undertaking of the Corpus, especially where it concerns the Codex and Digestae, 
was in the first place aimed at producing a codification that would be practical in 
use through a clear stating of the law. The Codex therefore consists of different 
books which are categorized thematically, each title comprising the rescripts on 
the subject at hand in a chronological order. Next to citing the Codex 
Gregorianus, Hermogenianus and Theodosianus, all kinds of previous imperial 
law were adapted, regardless of their original scope of application or means of 
promulgation: their presence in the Codex meant that they now had “the force of a 
general constitution.”42 Amongst this pluriform legal source material were case-
specific rescripts that mostly dated from pre-Constantine times, imperial epistulae 
to individual officials and edicta addressed at specific provinces.43 As for the 
Digestae, Justinian prided himself for collecting the authoritative juristic writings 
into one work, “a thing which no one has dared to expect or to desire.”44 The Digestae 
were thematically structured too and included a list of all the jurists whose 
authority permitted that they – or at least some of their work – be cited in court. 
Justinian’s Codex and Digestae were thus meant as collections of the existing 
imperial constitutions and legal writing until Justinian’s time only: this means, in 
line with the notion of the centrality of the citizen in the law, that its writers did 
not draw up general or new rules that were to guide expected scenarios, but only 
responded to the specific cases for which their expertise had been consulted. New 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
41 For references to other sources in which this confusion and uncertainty regarding the law are 
expressed and satirized see Matthews 2000, p. 19, and Jones 1966, p. 181.  
42 C. Haec and C. Summa 1 and C. Summa 3.  
43 Humfress 2005, p. 163. The promulgation of edicts and other forms of general imperial 
constitutions however continued, as C.1.14 points out.  
44 Deo Auctore 2.  
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cases were possibly judged according to general rules, but these rules had then 
been drawn from the existing case material.45 And of course there were also the 
Novellae for new imperial constitutions. For this reason, the Codex has been 
called “old wine in new skins,” but it did in fact reshape the law by the way it 
moulded all the existing material into one definite body.46  
For where Theodosius II only had all of the existing law collected – for the 
complete restatement of the law he had envisaged was never completed47 – 
Justinian’s codification project did not stop at just bringing the legal texts “which 
were scattered through various volumes”48 together in one volume. He also ordered 
that only provisions be selected that were still relevant in this time and that they 
were structured thematically. But his ambitions went yet further: he proclaimed 
that these provisions had also been rephrased to make them concise and that 
actual alterations in the text had been applied when this was to the advantage of 
the expediency of the law.49  Before the promulgation of Justinian’s Codex 
existing bodies of law were used next to each other and caused confusion or, in 
Justinian’s words, “obscurity.”50 Hence the Codex was ordered to be free from the 
redundant preambles, contradictions, repetitions and superseded provisions that 
were found in the source material.51 Justinian also declared it an on-going task of 
his to keep his codification up to date and comprehensive which led him, next to 
the constitution of his Novellae, to the enactment of the second edition of his 
Codex in 534. This edition absorbed the legislation that had been announced after 
529 but also strove to make the law flawless by providing a corrected version of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
45 Sirks 2008, p. 121.  
46 Humfress 2005, p. 161.  
47 C. Haec and Matthews 2000, p. 10.  
48 C. Cordi.  
49	  C.	  Haec	  2.	  	  
50 C. Summa 1.  
51 C. Summa 1. This was also the aim of the Digestae – see Deo Auctore.   
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the Codex in order to bring to light the provisions that had shown to be arcane 
through their incomprehensibleness after its promulgation.52  
The rigorous manner in which Justinian had his commission treat the material 
that went into the Codex made this part of the Corpus innovative.53 Both 
Justinian and Theodosius II used interpolation, a method of altering and 
shortening the legal material into one concise whole, but Justinian went beyond 
that by ordering that the texts be consistent with each other too,54 which resulted 
in excluding contradicting, redundant and repetitive material. 55  Editing and 
rephrasing also proved to be necessary where it concerned the Digestae: when in 
529 AD it was officially stated that authoritative juristic writings could be used 
alongside the Codex for the purpose of litigation, this would often cause 
confusion since those texts did not necessarily comply with each other, nor with 
the Codex.56 Selecting the relevant texts and collecting them into one work would 
not rid the texts of the contradictions that they contained and Justinian was 
compelled to solve such lack of clarity by having the “greater part of the ancient laws 
corrected and simplified, and all of the ancient law, freed from prolixity and difficulty, was 
put into our Institutes and Pandects.”57  
 
Exclusivity 
The second important feature that should be mentioned here is that the Codex 
was given strict exclusivity: the parts of the previous law that it did not cite were 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
52	  C.	  Cordi	  3	  and	  4.	  	  
53 Harries 1999, p. 24. And where they followed the structure of Theodosius II’s code in the first 
edition of the Codex, they completely overhauled it in the second edition of 534. See Birks 2008, 
p. 120 and also C. Cordi 4.  
54 C. Haec 2 and C. Summa 1. See also C. Cordi 2.  
55 C. Summa 1 and C. Cordi 3. See also Harries 1999, p. 24.  
56 C. Summa 3 and Humfress 2005, p. 165.   
57 C. Cordi 1.  
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repealed, and after its promulgation only the Codex could be used as a source of 
law.58 This had not always been the case: through the ages before Justinian’s reign 
Roman law spread from Rome and Italy to the provinces, where it would co-exist 
with local law as a kind of customary law, which was especially prevalent in the 
east of the empire. In this time people were free to choose between Roman and 
local law, be it that the latter would come to have precedence in case of 
interference.59  
But now, it was stated that Justinian’s Codex should be regarded as a general 
constitution that sufficed to settle all lawsuits.60 Initially this exclusivity did not 
mean that the authoritative works of jurisprudence were not to be used anymore 
for as long as their content was on a par with that of the Codex they could still be 
cited.61 Justinian thus acknowledged the importance of the law that came from 
sources other than the emperor as, indeed, the law that had been drawn up by 
praetors, senators and jurists predated that of the imperial law, with the Twelve 
Tables serving as the oldest example of this.62 But it has already been explained 
that it soon became clear that such other sources of law also needed to be 
reformed and moulded into Justinian’s codification in order to avoid all 
confusion, and so the Digestae were drawn up. The authority of Justinian’s code 
did however allow any pragmatic sanctions to stay in force as long as they 
concerned privileges granted to specific public or private bodies or individuals. 
Yet if they were issued to solve a certain conflict they were only deemed valid if 
they did not contradict the Codex, the new law thus superseding the old.63 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
58	  C.	  Summa	  3	  and	  C.	  Cordi	  4.	  	  
59 Garnsey 2006, pp. 143-149 and Humfress 2013 (I), p. 80.  
60 C. Summa 3.  
61 C. Summa 3.  
62 Humfress 2005, p. 165.  
63 C. Summa 4.  
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The expression of Justinian’s commitment to providing justice in his 
codification  
Justinian’s codification project might have caused a significant change in how the 
usefulness of the law was perceived after this allegedly clear, authoritative and 
exclusive body of law had been delivered. Justinian certainly expressed a concern 
with serving the receiving end of this codification project, which were his citizens, 
as he linked the promulgation of this code to his commitment to serving the 
common good.64 This consideration for the common benefit is linked to the 
providing of peace and protection within the borders:“(s)o we, too, learning from 
God and from justice – though we are overburdened with care to the end that the Romans 
may increase in virtue and that the barbarians may be conquered – are not without 
solicitude, that proper provisions be made in things which are of benefit to private people.”65  
 
But most importantly here, Justinian clearly connects his new codification with  
the providing of justice to his people. For the law is “the art of goodness and 
fairness,”66 a “fitting and most holy temple of justice,”67 and “(o)f that art we (jurists) are 
deservedly called the priests. For we cultivate the virtue of justice and claim awareness of 
what is good and fair, discriminating between fair and unfair, distinguishing lawful from 
unlawful, aiming to make men good not only through fear of penalties but also indeed 
under allurement of rewards, and affecting a philosophy which, if I am not deceived, is 
genuine, not a sham,” so it was phrased by Ulpian in the third century and adopted 
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  C.	  Haec	  and	  C.	  Haec	  3.	  	  
65 N.164, preface.   
66 D.1.1.1. 
67 Deo Auctore 5.  
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into Justinian’s Digest.68 The law seems in fact to be defined by this virtue of 
justice, which is presented as something very important and almost sacred. This 
virtue shows what is fair and just through polarizing what is fair and what is not, 
and sanctioning or rewarding certain behaviour. The virtues of equity and justice 
should even be given prevalence over the very maintenance of the law, if it comes 
to this: “(i)t has been accepted as law that the foremost aim in all things should be justice 
and equity, rather than to follow the strict letter of the law.”69  
Justinian expresses the principle of justice as a vital one for the general governing 
of the empire, too: “(t)here is nothing greater than God and justice. Nothing that should 
be done could be done without them, especially in our state; by their aid it is possible to 
govern justly and to lead our subjects to love and kindness of heart.”70 What does 
governing and living in accordance with this principle of justice entail? “Justice is a 
steady and enduring will to render unto everyone his right. 1. The basic principles of right 
are: to live honourably, not to harm any other person, to render each his own.”71 (The 
importance of the last part of this last sentence will become apparent in Part III.)  
It is provided that only the emperor himself can make a decision when doubt 
arises between equity and law,72 thus safeguarding that the law is explained in the 
way that fits best with its envisaged rendering of justice. 
 
Since justice is thus described as a crucial virtue for the government of the 
emperor (whether this was indeed the case will also receive attention later), and 
the law presented as the source to provide justice, it is not surprising that 
Justinian would strive to this law being in good shape, which thus lead to the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
68	  D.1.1.1.1.	  	  
69 C.3.1.8.  
70	  N.	  164.	  	  
71	  D1.1.1.10.	  	  
72	  C.1.14.1.	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restatement of it that was the Corpus. For this reworking of the legal texts was 
done “in order that not only the Institutes and Digests might be clear and intelligible, but 
that the light also of the constitutions of our Code might shine brightly for all.”73 He also 
expressed that his codification would “lift the obscurity which hinders the decisions of 
judges.”74 And his code would also augment the public welfare through its 
decreasing of the complexity of lawsuits.75  
 
Other motivations for the promulgation of the Corpus 
It should however be noted here, that other motivations could be distinguished 
for Justinian’s establishing of his Corpus. For he also used his codification as a 
way to exhibit his power and add grandeur to it, and to exercise his authority 
over both public and private affairs by presenting his codification as one definite 
body of law. 76  In addition, Humfress, with Jones, argues that ‘barbarian’ 
Burgundian and Visigothic kings in the west had started to promulgate their own 
collections of Roman law, and though Justinian does not refer to this, it might 
have motivated him to order his own version.77  
This corresponded with the more general course of his reign. For whilst the 
different parts of the Corpus were being composed, Justinian pursued to restore 
the imperial authority over the West in his quest for renovatio imperii, the aim to 
rehabilitate the world empire of Rome. This went together with an ideology of 
reform and expansion, which aimed at the reconquest of lost territories and at a 
planned economic policy that would support the increased demands of such 
military undertakings, establishment of religious unity in the empire, the 	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  C.	  Cordi	  3.	  	  
74	  C.	  Summa	  1.	  	  
75 C. Haec.  
76 Pazdernik 2005, p. 187.  
77	  Humfress	  2005,	  pp.	  162-­‐163.	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construction of a large amount of public buildings and reorganization of the 
administrative and judicial apparatus.78  
These aims were only partially met as the available resources did not suffice, but 
the composition of the Corpus was indeed a success. It has been argued that its 
text witnesses the ideology of the renovation that visualized an ideal world with 
an emperor who held absolute power, which was given to him by God.79 The 
Corpus also redefined the connection between the emperor’s office and the 
establishment of the law, which were more dispersed and fluent before: 
Justinian’s law now was explicitly meant to uphold the very ‘state’ itself.80 
 
Conclusion 
As a legislator and emperor, Justinian was concerned with providing justice in the 
form of a certain, clear body of law, which he declared to have “eternal value.”81 
He went to great lengths to accomplish this striving for clarity, and did not 
hesitate to show how he beat his predecessors in this – which he did indeed. For 
Justinian delivered a complete restatement of the law, both where it concerned 
the juristic writings and imperial constitutions, and continued to modify and 
update it throughout his reign. With this codification Justinian aimed to show his 
commitment to providing his people with justice. For the authority of the law 
“expels all iniquity.”82 Justinian’s commitment to providing justice through his 
code becomes apparent from certain qualities of this law, most importantly its 
practicality and exclusivity, but also from explicit phrasing which has here mainly 
been drawn from the preambles to the Codex. The authority that Justinian’s code 	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was to enjoy – and which was, it was argued, necessary for it in order to be 
successful in providing people with justice – also served Justinian’s reign in other 
ways. This will be elaborated on in the following, but first it will be explained 
how Justinian’s code dealt with and maintained the strict hierarchy that 
characterized late antiquity.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
	   27	  
Chapter 2: How did Justinian’s codification treat differences in 
power between groups in late antique society? 
 
Introduction 
We have seen that Justinian claimed that his codification should provide justice 
within his jurisdiction by supplying its subjects with a clear, authoritative body of 
law. This law was thus to be used for the common benefit and to protect all 
citizens by supplying them with a a law that cherished the virtue of justice. But 
what did ‘justice’ mean, according to Justinian’s law, in a society that was deeply 
stratified and knew very large differences in power between groups? It seems that, 
though it was made clear that it should be provided to all people, justice did not 
entail the same for everyone when it came to its substance. For the stratification 
of society was not deemed problematic by the law, but in fact supported, which 
meant that every category within the populace was granted its own kind of 
justice. What was identified as a wrong and threat to justice was the fact that 
some people were in the position to overturn the social hierarchy, and thus also 
the law that was in accordance with it. But before this will be discussed, the 
question will be answered how Justinian’s commitment to providing justice to the 
people through his law was related to the high stratification of late antique society 
and the different groups that comprised its populace. This will be done by 
studying provisions in the Codex that are concerned with these differing 
treatment of certain groups in court. Therefore first a brief outline will be given of 
the hierarchy of late antique society, and mainly the aspects of it that are relevant 
here, which can be boiled down to the difference between those with officially 
appointed power and the weaker parties without this. Then, the maintenance of 
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this stratification of society in Justinian’s code will be discussed, which is split 
into the commencement and involvement of a case and the necessity of 
representation that sometimes came with this involvement. The reflection of the 
stratification of the late Roman society can mainly be found in the civil law 
provisions in the Codex, but as a side note some criminal law provisions will be 
used as they very clearly articulate how status-dependent the treatment by the law 
was at this time. 
 
The stratification of late antique society and differences in power between 
groups  
Highest in power was the emperor himself. In describing his power and grandeur 
the boundary between the earthly and the divine sometimes became blurred.83 
This relates to the image of the emperor standing between God and humanity, 
striving with his help to recreate the heavenly order on earth, whilst 
simultaneously acknowledging God’s supremacy.84 This representation of power 
that was supported by an emphasis on the sacredness of imperial actions and a 
vast use of ceremony underlined the distance between the emperor and his 
subjects, but can also be seen as the legitimization of the emperor’s absolute 
power and as the ideology that was helped to hold such a vast empire together.85 
 
The upper classes 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
83 Kelly 1997, pp. 139 -140.  
84 Kelly 1997, p. 141. See also C. Haec and C.1.17.1.1-2.  
85 Kelly 1997, p. 143 and 145.  
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Social classes were officially ranked in order of dignity, which was linked to the 
office one was appointed to. This can be drawn from the law against the 
Donatists of 412, which appoints to every rank the appropriate monetary fine.86  
As Garnsey describes, people of high status commonly enjoyed great advantages 
in court, not only because they often happened to be the favoured parties in a 
legally regulated relationship like that of creditor and debtor or landlord and 
tenant. For as they were generally more affluent they were also able to enjoy 
certain benefits of the law that others could not – they could for example afford 
bail where poor litigants had no choice but to go to prison. But there was also the 
explicitly favoured treatment that the law would grant them because of their rank. 
The inequality in the legal system thus existed both de facto and de iure.87 
Examples of this latter situation will be given in the following section.  
The upper classes were collectively called the honestiores. They possessed the 
criteria for legal privilege, which are in Garnsey’s words “the dignity and prestige 
associated with good birth and character and the possession of wealth and office.”88 This 
then concerned the members of the senatorial and equestrian order and officials 
ranked from the highest imperial offices to the senatorial aristocracy down to 
municipal level. But also those who practiced liberal professions, such as 
architects, doctors, professors, priests and soldiers belonged to this category.89 The 
honestiores were thus a large and varied group, but the biggest parts consisted of 
the army and those appointed as decurions or curiales, town councillors who 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
86 Marcone 1997, p. 360 and C.Th. 16.5.52.  
87 Garnsey 1968, p. and 3.  
88 Garnsey 1968, p. 19.  
89 Jones 1966, p. 282 and Marcone 1997, pp. 359-360. Regarding the organization of the imperial 
bureaucracy, many laws can be found in books 1 and 6 of the Codex Theodosianus, and  for 
example in the first book of Justinian’s Codex. As for the situation in the fourth century, Kelly 
mentions the Notitia Dignitatum, a document that listed all civil and military ranks and 
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fulfilled several public duties and who were almost by definition landowners, 
though great differences in wealth existed between them with some being large 
landowners and others peasant farmers.90  
The honestiores had characterizing virtues, like social standing (dignitas), good 
reputation (existimatio) and prestige (auctoritas.)91 But there were also subdivisions 
amongst them other than those that ran along the lines of wealth and type of 
profession. This  became especially clear in the west, where there was a social gap 
between the senatorial aristocracy who had become powerful through their 
property and nobility of birth, and the functional aristocracy who had acquired 
their position through their good services at the court.92   
There were also shifts in the subdivisions of this class over time. For example, the 
senatorial order expanded greatly in the late empire, which had consequences for 
the titles it used: the title of clarissimus became the title of least prestige as it came 
to be applied to many thousands of officials under Justinian, where it had been 
the prerogative of the exclusive body of Roman senators before.93 And though the 
stratification of society was very strong, there were different kinds of interactions 
between these upper classes and the lower ones, some of which had been crafted 
formally: the nobiles or those possessing nobility of birth, who were also part of 
the honestiores, had great responsibilities regarding the relations between the 
imperial authority and the urban plebs, and the senatorial aristocracy was known 
to mediate between the imperial court and the local aristocracies.94  
 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
90 Jones 1966, pp. 228-3.  
91 Garnsey 1968, p. 9.  
92 Marcone 1997, p. 354.  
93 Jones 1966, p. 270 and Marcone 1997, p. 356.  
94 Marcone 1997, pp. 355-6.  
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The lower classes 
Those who did not belong to the honestiores were considered humiliores, amongst 
whom were small artisans and agricultural workers. The humiliores were often 
classed as plebeii.95 Even lower are coloni (peasant farmers) and slaves.96 Though 
there were differences between the urban and rural plebs, the lower classes 
showed to be more homogenous than the elite. Most of all they were united in 
their judicial weakness and subjection to personal and patrimonial obligations.97 
The lower classes were often severely disadvantaged when it came to lawsuits in 
which they had to stand their case against a party of higher social status as the 
judge might be biased towards their opponent’s side. Various forms of abuse of 
power of these powerful people against lower classes were also frequent, as 
regulations show. For example, one provision in the Digest reads: “the provincial 
governor should be religiously zealous in preventing more influential people from inflicting 
wrongs on those of lower station and in seeing that those who defend the latter are not 
framed up on charges of infamous crime when they are innocent.”98 So, influential 
people apparently tried to abuse weaker parties, and protection of such weak 
parties was proclaimed a duty for governors, as was the persecution of innocent 
weak parties with false charges. Such protection of the weak was indeed meant to 
happen at a local level, but the emperor himself was concerned with this too:  
 
“If some person of power becomes insolent, and the presidents of the province personally are unable to punish, 
try, or pronounce sentence against him, they should report his name to us, or at least to the praetorian 
prefecture, so that means may be taken as to how to protect the public interest and the injured common 
people.”99 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
95 Jones 1966, p. 290.  
96 Marcone 1997, p. 357 and 360.  
97 Marcone 1997, pp. 356-7.  
98 D.1.18.6.2. See also the various examples of such legislation that Dillon gives, Dillon 2012 pp. 
196-200.  
99 C.1.40.2. See also C. Th. 1.16.4, en C.Th.1.15.1.  
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There were also ways of protection that were not regulated by the law. The use of 
patronage can serve as an example, as this concerned a relationship based on 
inequality of status in which the more powerful patron and his protegé exchanged 
favours for mutual benefit. One of the common favours of the patron was to use 
his reputation to help get a powerful and unwilling adversary to court where he 
would have stayed away otherwise.100 Another was to call for the aid of a local 
auctioneer, who had a financial interest in the matter, to enforce a seizure of the 
defendant’s property, or to appeal to the Roman social conscience: since 
maintaining a good name was generally considered important, as was good 
standing with the magistrates, it was not considered beneficial to consequently 
refuse obeying summons.101 Even more, a person of high reputation might have 
been especially conscious of the possibility of damage to his reputation.102  
Of course, several other distinctions were made between people next to those 
depending on social rank, such as that between slaves and free men, which was 
“the basic division in the law of persons” according to Garnsey.103 Slaves were treated 
as completely different subjects from free man and could only under very specific 
circumstances invoke legal actions. Another division is that of men and women, 
and citizens and aliens. Justinian’s Corpus differentiates between these categories 
of people as it differentiates between people of low and high status. In the 
following these differences will also be mentioned but only in the scheme of the 
more general distinguishing of the law between those considered weak and 
strong, and the special provisions that existed to mediate their positions in 
litigation.  	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101 Garnsey 1968, p. 8. 
102 Harries 2001, pp. 69-71.  
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The maintenance of this stratification and differences in power in Justinian’s 
codification: commencing litigation 
The distinction between strong and weak people readily becomes visible in the 
provisions on the commencement of a case. In general, admissibility of a case 
depended on its nature: if a crime directly affected the integrity of another person, 
such as in the case of murder or infliction of wounds, a written accusation could 
be filed and the judge would determine whether the complainant could continue 
to publicly prosecute the accused.104 In some cases, such as those concerning 
treason, counterfeiting or combinations for the control of corn, there was a 
general right of accusation: in others, like in cases of adultery, only the people 
directly interested had this right (in this case that would have been the husband, 
father or an other near relative).105 However, some groups were excluded from or 
restricted in starting prosecution.106 Women, for instance, could only accuse 
someone of a crime if they had been personally affected by it.107 Freedmen could 
not file accusations against their former patrons,108 nor could members of a 
household accuse the master thereof.109 Hence it was impossible or difficult for 
certain groups to file a case. This is also shown by the provision that the praetor 
was expected to withhold from a man of low rank or humilis an action of fraud 
against his social superior.110  
After a complaint had been filed successfully, some people could once again find 
themselves in a disadvantaged position: for Garnsey writes that when it came to 
the verdict, even without common practices such as corruption or threat of force, 	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108 C.9.1.21 and C.9.1.17 (see Blume’s footnote.)  
109 C.9.1.20.  
110 D.4.3.11.1.  
	   34	  
a man of influence would stand a good chance winning his case, as judges were 
easily – and in their minds rightfully – impressed by qualities such as social 
prominence, wealth and good character. In the same way the social status of 
witnesses could play a role: their social position and character could be found just 
as relevant as the quality of their evidence.111 But there were cases of sheer 
manipulation too: to pursue the most beneficial outcome, well-connected litigants 
would try to have their case heard in a court where they expected to find a 
sympathetic hearing. The payment of legal fees and tips was not uncommon 
either, as were attempts to cause inconvenience and unnecessary expense to 
adversaries.112  
 
Involvement in lawsuits and the necessity of representation  
One of the sharpest distinctions between groups the Codex makes is that between 
slaves and free men, the latter group consisting of both freeborn and freedmen.113 
Slaves could not be party to an action.114 They therefore had to be defended in 
court by their master in the case of accusation of a crime, but the slave himself 
would have to undergo the punishment if found guilty.115 Also, slaves were not 
generally entitled to file a supplication though an exception could be made in a 
case concerning an “atrocious crime” – that is the murder of the master – and if the 
petitioner was a slave who had shown “laudable faithfulness” in having this crime 
punished.116 
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112 Humfress 2013 (II) p. 239.  
113 D.1.5.3-4.  
114 C.3.1.6.  
115 C.9.2.2, C.9.2.13 and C.3.41.4. 
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Another big distinction was that between men and women, for it was stated that 
“(t)here are many points in our law in which the condition of females is inferior to that of 
males.”117 Women were for example not qualified to act for their husbands.118 In 
general, it was constituted that “it is clear that the defence of others is a function of the 
male sex and is outside the sphere of women. If your son, therefore, is a minor under the age 
of puberty, ask for a guardian for him.”119 They could thus not act as defenders in a 
suit or be guardians for minors, unless they had lost their husbands and made a 
statement under oath that they would not remarry.120 But generally speaking 
women were not meant to litigate: “(l)et a husband have full power, without mandate, 
to attend to the (judicial) transactions of his wife, by giving the customary surety and 
observing the other formalities, so that women may not, under the pretence of prosecuting a 
lawsuit, and in contravention of matronly modesty, boldly rush into assemblies of men, or 
be compelled to be present at trials. But if any person has received a mandate from her, 
though it be her husband, he must only execute what the given power prescribes.”121 There 
was an exception possible when a woman wished to take legal action on behalf of 
her parents if they were prevented by doing this themselves and there was no man 
to do so.122  
Then, there were persons under 25 who were considered minors, as “persons of this 
age are weak and deficient in sense and subject to many kinds of disadvantage.”123 Minors 
could therefore only sue and be sued in a civil case if accompanied by their 
guardian.124  
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These provisions show a clear distinction in treatment between groups of people, 
but they also seem to provide for protection of these weaker groups, such as 
minors, against stronger ones. Just as well, it was considered best that some men 
who were of high rank, and could therefore influence the outcome of their case, 
appointed a procurator to represent them.125 Also, some vulnerable groups were 
not obliged to come to the emperor’s court if they were called in a case that he 
would judge, but could go to a local court instead – however, if the situation was 
reversed and it was a more vulnerable person seeking justice with the emperor, 
their adversary had to appear before him: 
 
“If anyone obtains an order of our Lenity against any minor under the age of puberty, widow, or person long 
afflicted or weak with disease, the persons mentioned shall not be compelled by any of our judges to appear at 
our court. Trial of the dispute shall rather be had within the province within which the litigant, the witnesses 
and the documents are, and every precaution shall be taken that they may not be compelled to go outside of the 
provinces. 1. But if minors under the age of puberty, widows and others, wretched through the injuries of fate, 
pray a rescript of Our Serenity, especially when they fear anyone’s power, their adversaries shall appear before 
us.”126   
 
These instances show that there was a concern for the possibility that differences 
in power would influence people’s behaviour in court, and even their decision to 
go to court in the first place. They thus needed protection by the law. At the same 
time some of these differences were in fact underpinned by Justinian’s Codex. 
Another illustration of this can be found in the differences in legal punishment. 
For in penal law there was a highly differential treatment for the legal categories 
of honestiores and humiliores, with honestiores generally enjoying milder 
punishment for the same crimes than the plebs.127 For example, where the 
punishment of a husband who had killed his wife after he had caught her in 
adultery entailed “forced labour in perpetuity” for a person of low rank, a person of 	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higher status would be relegated to an island.128 More generally, in the Digest can 
be found that: “(O)ur ancestors, whatever the punishment, penalized slaves more severely 
than freemen, and notorious persons more than those of unblemished reputation.”129 Rules 
on torture differed greatly too.130 
There were thus differences in treatment between different kinds of people that 
were explicitly maintained, and there were provisions that aimed to regulate court 
procedure and eliminate differences in position, for which as another example 
could serve the provision that litigants with an inexperienced lawyer were to be 
protected against the potential disadvantage of the other party having a very 
famous or well-seasoned lawyer.131 But there were also circumstances that clearly 
must have impaired people’s access to justice and which were not 
counterbalanced by the Codex or other parts of Justinian’s code, the most 
important being the cost of litigation. This included the court fees or sportulae, 
official fees paid to the judges, extra money paid for bribery, payment of the 
advocate, and travel costs. As Kelly has shown, these costs were often so high 
that in many cases it was probably not found worth the risk of investing a very 
considerable amount of savings. This meant that usually only the wealthy could 
afford the costs, and to make things worse some privileged groups of officials 
received discounts for litigating too.132 The Codex does not give any provisions 
that are concerned with this circumstance, which must have greatly impaired the 
access to justice that the Corpus aimed to provide, though it does regulate the 
amounts that had to be paid.133 Luckily there were other forms of dispute 	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131 C.2.6.7 and C.2.6.7.1. 
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resolution that were generally cheaper, such as arbitration. This was also a less 
dangerous and more social option. And so was the swearing of oaths, and of 
course the filing of petitions, to get free, legal advice directly from the emperor.134  
 
Conclusion  
Justinian aimed to provide justice to the people by making clear how such justice 
was provided for the different groups that made up society. It thus seems that in 
this context justice meant that the same rules applied to all members of one 
category, with the law reflecting this categorization of society.  
What can also be concluded here is that legislation seemed to have been merely a 
means to pursue certain goals or an instrument for those who were in the 
fortunate position to use it – and this was certainly not everybody. For though 
Justinian’s code did provide for rules that prohibited various crimes and forms of 
abuse both outside and inside the courtroom, it was very much up to its subjects 
to enforce it: as Millar writes, “the body of rules thus created was not so much enforced 
by any apparatus or government as available for use by interested parties making claims or 
bringing suits and then by officials, or Emperors, giving rules in response.”135 This 
generally meant that mainly the wealthy and powerful could have put 
enforcement of the law to their use.  
Moreover, in distinguishing sorts of justice per group the Codex rather established 
than abandoned the differences between groups in society, as it clearly stated 
what they could do (and more often what they could not.) For having a law that 
gave justice to its subjects did not mean here that the same rules had to be held for 
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all subjects, in order to apply a form of legal equality or egalitarianism that we 
would think necessary nowadays.  
And lastly, Justinian’s law did not try to actively defy the barriers that kept people 
from entering the legal system, like the court fees, that are usually scrutinized to 
assess if and how access to justice was arranged for. These fees were in fact set by 
the emperors themselves, who must have been well aware of the fact that they 
could exclude people from having their case trialed.  
The differences in society that were maintained in Justinian’s code bore certain 
risks with them for the upholding of this very code – for what happened if people 
managed to obtain power outside this categorization? This will be the focus of the 
next chapter.   
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Chapter 3: Which potential threats to the providing of justice were 
identified and provided for by Justinian’s codification? 
 
 
 
Introduction 
The examination of Justinian’s Corpus – and mainly his Codex – thus far has 
shown us how Justinian expressed a commitment to justice through providing his 
people with an exclusive, clear body of law, and how this was done in accordance 
with the layers that society consisted of. But the provisions of the Codex whose 
light might now “shine brightly for all”136 can also be used to tell us what threats 
Justinian’s intention to provide justice faced in late antique society. These threats 
were discerned in the form of problems and practices that occurred inside and 
outside of the courtroom, of which some were made illegal by the emperor in 
response to complaints he received about them. Part of the countering of such 
behaviour that was done through such rescripts, both dating from Justinian’s own 
reign and from reigns before his, found its way into the Codex. At least a share of 
these complaints to the emperor must have come from the lowest ranks of 
society, for this was an attractive way of direct access to the emperor in his 
position as ultimate source of the law.137 Rescripts can thus serve here as a 
valuable source to our understanding of the problems that were faced in the 
providing of justice as envisaged by the emperor. And since Justinian had ordered 
his committee to consequently select only those provisions still relevant in his day 
– in contrast to the Codex Theodosianus138 – it can indeed be used to get an image 
of the problems and threats for the legal system that Justinian and his imperial 	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jurists thought the provision of justice encountered, and how these were 
responded to. Below, one provision (C.2.14(15).1) will be elaborated to show how 
such a threat was articulated and whom it concerned. It will then be shown how 
this provision relates to other provisions that are addressed at comparable 
problems, and how these problems related to the hierarchy of society.  It will thus 
become clear that the imperial office had a general concern with the abuse of 
influential people by people of lower status of the names, as happened in different 
situations. It will also be shown how the power of influential people was 
manipulatively used by these powerful people themselves and their protégés, and 
how the emperor tried to fight such misbehaviour by penalizing it through 
rescripts and new legislation. 
 
 
Book II, Title XIV (XV): 
Concerning those who put placards on their landed estates in the name of dignitaries, or who use their 
name as a pretence in a lawsuit 
 
C.2.14(15).1. Emperors Arcadius and Honorus to Messala, Praetorian Prefect. 
We have noticed that many defendants, in despair of the righteousness of their causes, oppose the placards of 
influential men and the privileges of men of honourable rank to those by whom they are sued.  
 
1. And lest they misuse these names and placards in fraud of the laws and to the terror of adversaries, persons 
(of influence) who knowingly connive at such fraud shall by public sentence be branded with infamy. 
 
2. But if they did not give their consent that labels or placards in their names should be fastened to the 
buildings of others, those who did so shall be scourged with leaden balls and sent into perpetual exile in the 
mines. 
 
3. Whoever, therefore, has been sued, although he is the possessor of the property in dispute and of the legal 
right thereto and has received the notice of a suit brought in the customary manner and in his defence 
(contradictoris libellis) or thinks that he should introduce notices in the name of another (as owner), shall be 
punished by the loss of the possession or legal right which by this fraud he attempted to retain or evade, nor 
shall he have opportunity of renewing the action, even though the merits of a likely cause support him.139 
 
4. Persons, indeed, who voluntarily suffer themselves to be involved in lawsuits of others shall, when they are 
entitled to neither ownership nor possession, be branded as men careless of their reputation, and, for a 
consideration, engaged in chicanery. 
Given at Milan December 27 (400). 
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As Blume points out, placards were commonly used to mark the ownership of 
property. This was not illegal provided that it was done “honestly.” 140  The 
regulation above counters a frequently occurring dishonest use (“(w)e have noticed 
that many defendants...”), in which people of lower status seek protection by using 
“placards of influential men and the privileges of men of honourable rank” to convince 
their opponents that their case is hopeless by trying to scare them. These 
opponents were probably socially or economically stronger than the 
complainants, which urged the latter to use an intimidating name like that of  a 
potentior  (see below) or clarissimus.141 This practice was sanctioned, regarding both 
the cases in which the influential person whose name was used was aware and 
the cases in which he was unaware of this fraud. Note that the penalty for the 
influential person who willingly let this happen is infamy, which could be 
described as the deprivation of citizen status, and with this participation in public 
life and access to the legal system.142 For a person of influential rank, who derived 
much of his status from his public function, this must have been a humiliating 
and effective punishment. It is however wholly different in nature from the 
sanction mentioned in the paragraph that follows, which threatens defendants 
who committed such fraud without the influential person’s consent with 
perpetual forced labour in the mines. Hence this provision threatens people of 
different social status with different punishments. This suits the conviction that 
the severity of punishment had to be fitted to the social status of the perpetrator, 
but it also seems to point at the thought that since the use of power was quite 
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140 Blume, note to C.2.14 (15).1. 
141 Wacke 1980, p. 583. See for a similar regulation on the abuse of placards with the emperor’s 
name C.2.15(16), filed in the same period.  
142 Garnsey 2006, p. 144. See also D.3.2, which shows how infamia was used as a threat to 
different offences.  
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cases provided for by the law. Using someone else’s power without their consent 
was however seen as a wrong that had to be weighed quite differently, as it was 
not a gradual difference but rather a flagrant crime that harmed the structuring of 
society that the legal system was upholding.  
The next thing that could be noted about this regulation in the light of its 
sanctioning of such abuse is its structure. From the initial signalling of the wrong 
and pressing how frequently it occurs it thus continues to list the differentiated 
sanctioning of it. Then, a more general statement is made in C.2.14(15).1.4, 
warning that people who engage in the lawsuits of others shall be “branded as men 
careless of their reputation, and, for a consideration, engaged in chicanery.” The 
injunction of chicanery was in fact the requirement to act in good faith during 
court procedure and not commit vexatious or contentious litigation.143 Chicanery 
was considered a defamatory practice and again it is arguable that especially 
people of high rank were wise to avoid this as it could harm the reputation that 
they must have held dear. The structure of this regulation seems to be showing us 
how the appearance of a specific problem led to legislation that was reached 
further than the situation it was primarily targeted at. In this respect it should also 
be mentioned that the provision talks of defendants abusing these placards. 
Though there could have been reasons why a defendant would have more readily 
committed to this practice than a complainant (for example because the 
complainant was socially superior, which urged the defendant to wrongly invoke 
the powerful name of his patron or someone else), it appears here that the 
emperor’s office had in fact received complaints of instances in which it was the 
defendant who did this, which then led to this response. The provision above was 
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however directed at an over all banishment of this practice and thus also 
concerned the parties initiating a suit.  
 
The powerful people that C.2.14 (15).1 is concerned with 
Though the title of C.2.14(15) speaks of “dignitaries” or powerful people in 
general,144 the first paragraph is directed at frauds committed with placards of 
“influential men and the privileges of men of honourable rank.” These were two distinct 
categories, but they could overlap. The phrasing of the powerful people in 
question here relates to an aspect of the classification of late antique society that 
deserves special attention. 
The “men of honourable rank” here were honestiores. More specifically, the Latin 
phrasing points out that these were the honestiores carrying the title of 
“clarissimus.” It has already been described how this was originally a very 
exclusive title that fell prey to the great inflation of honorary titles in the later 
empire, and under Justinian this title was even excluded from membership of the 
senate and shrunk to little more than “few privileges and not much prestige.”145 The 
bearers of this title were however still part of the aristocracy and thus honestiores.  
 
Then, the qualification of “influential men” points at a social category which was 
very important, but did not correspond with a legally defined rank within the 
social system like the other group mentioned in this provision: it is that of the  
potentiores (or possessores.) In the literal sense this word was used in a comparative 
manner, to show that some people were of greater wealth and influence than 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
144“De his, qui potentiorum nomine titulos praediis adfigunt vel eorum nomina in lite praetendunt.” 
145 Jones 1966, p. 270 and 274.  
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others.146 This word however became a social and economical category of its own 
that signified people who distinguished themselves from others by their property 
and not their legal rank. The group of potentiores was understood to exist of large 
landowners with great local influence, who constantly competed with each other 
in their desire to increase their property and power.147  
Where honestiores were contrasted with humiliores, the same went for potentiores 
and tenuiores (who are in fact very comparable to the humiliores.) But different 
mechanisms were at work here: where honestiores were granted privileges that 
humiliores were deprived of, the potentiores were rather negatively provided with 
a set of prohibitions that were aimed at the protection of tenuiores.148 Both cases 
are thus regulations of behaviour amongst a powerful and a weak counterpart, 
but one is explicitly positive where the other addresses the power of the stronger 
group in a far more restricting and negative way.  
As potentiores typically exercised some political office – allegedly with the 
intention to use or increase their potentia, thereby not eschewing abuse and 
interference – they could be part of the honestiores. Some of them were decuriones 
or curiales, town councillors who fulfilled several public duties and who were 
almost by definition landowners, be it with great differences in wealth amongst 
them.149 MacMullen describes how some decuriones were both great landowners 
and in charge of the city taxes, which rendered “a double opportunity to intimidate, 
brutalize and extort,” whereas other decuriones were far less wealthy and became 
victims of this concentration of power.150 This was acted against in the Codex by 
a provision that stated that decurions could only sell land with permission of a 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
146 MacMullen 1988, p. 94.  
147 MacMullen 1988, p. 118-9. See also Wacke 1980, p. 578.  
148 Wacke 1980, p. 579.  
149 Oxford Classical Dictionary, under ‘decuriones’ and Jones 1966, pp. 282-3.  
150 MacMullen 1988, pp. 48-9. See also Marcone 1997, p. 360.  
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judge whom had been shown why such selling was necessary.151 In this way it 
was provided for that poorer decurions would less easily sell off their land to 
richer colleagues, whilst continuing to bear the duties and burdens that were 
opposed on them (which also meant that they were vulnerable to the threats of 
potentiores that came with these duties.)152 
Dillon describes the potentiores as “men whose influence might overshadow the 
restricted and transitory power of their nominal governors,” signifying that they had 
enough power to be compelled to put pressure on the governor or manipulate 
him, or that they even might have been more powerful than him.153 In doing so 
they were just as well able to further aggravate the status of weaker, defenceless 
groups.  
 
It is thus understandable that in order to uphold the legal system, which was 
based on the official appointment of privileges and power to certain offices and 
the withholding of power to others, the emperor sought to reduce the power that 
the potentiores had themselves acquired through their landownership and official 
duties and that they could use to manipulate this system or even overturn it. So, 
next to the articulated concern with the less influential groups who could suffer 
under the potentiores’ behaviour, the emperor himself had an interest in keeping 
the power of these powerful people limited through the use of legislation, so as to 
secure the stratification of society as it was established in the law.   
Next to the provision mentioned above, different measures can be found in the 
Codex that are addressed at curbing the power of the potentiores by penalizing its 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
151 C.10.34.1. 
152 Wacke 1980, p. 581.  
153 Dillon 2012, p. 196.  
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excrescences. The rise of the potentiores and the burden they placed on provincial 
jurisdiction in the later 4th and 5th centuries was already dealt with by 
Constantine, as can be derived from provisions of his in the Codex 
Theodosianus.154 It then later it found its way into the Corpus.  
Often, the terrorization of weaker parties by potentiores – with or without official 
positions – was enough to initiate imperial legislation. In the Codex 
Theodosianus a regulation can be found that is directed at potentiores using their 
positions to force parents to betroth their daughters to certain parties.155 Another 
example from Justinian’s Codex is the forbidding of extortion.156  
Several problems with potentiores also arose where it came to the regulation of tax 
payment. Tax avoidance by potentiores happened along the western frontiers of the 
empire,157 and the levying of taxes was also abused by them: for in order to 
“relieve the fortunes of the lowlier curiales and restrain the pressure of the potentes in the 
same curia”158 it was decided that tax assessments, which were done by the curiales, 
were only to become valid after they had been registered with the governors, so 
that the blackmailing of some curiales by their more powerful colleagues could be 
prevented.159  
 
Other provisions that relate to C.2.14(15).1 
The power that potentiores enjoyed was not only abused by themselves but also by 
those seeking their protection, as C.2.14(15).1 has already made clear. Other 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
154 Dillon 2012, pp.196-7. Dillon mentions for example C.Th.1.16.4 and C.Th.1.15.1.  
155 C.Th.3.6.1. Such terror could also be exercised by members of the army; C.12.60(61).1. See, 
generally, MacMullen 1988, p. 142 and 263, supra note 59. 
156 C.2.19.12. See also C.2.19 in general, Wacke 1980 p. 587 and Marcone 1997, p. 360.  
157 C.11.60 (59).1.1. See MacMullen 1988, p. 232, supra note 149.  
158 C.10.22.1.  
159 MacMullen 1988, p. 234, supra note 168. See also Marcone 1997, pp. 360-1 on this 
blackmailing of poorer curiales.  
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examples of the emperor countering such behaviour can be found in the Codex,  
such as a regulation directed at “taking refuge under the patronage of another” to 
avoid public taxes.160 Augustine is also known to have reported of a bishop who 
tried to avoid taxes by falsely marking his land as property of a potentior.161 
Such tax avoidance was done through transferring personal property to that of 
one’s patron. As Blume explains, large estates were often agri excepti, which 
means that they were outside of the network of civitates (city-states) and in direct 
dependence on the central government. They were ruled by large landowners 
through their procurators and not formally exempt from imperial taxes, but in 
practice they did enjoy advantageous treatment and were free from the heavy 
municipal taxes. Less influential possessors and sometimes even whole villages 
sought the protection of such landowners, often through the system of 
patronage.162 This serves to illustrate how powerful these large landowners were, 
and how attractive it was to seek their protection. Some potentiores even 
maintained their own prisons to exercise a strong but illegal form of local 
power.163 
A related abuse mentioned in the same book is the use of patronage for rent or 
other means of financial gain, which is sanctioned too, and is directed at powerful 
individuals who would take other (less powerful) people’s slaves and protect these 
against their master.164 Such a provision also existed where it concerned the help 
of powerful people that was sought to manipulate the customary course and 
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160 C.11.54.1.  
161 Wacke 1980, p. 583. 
162 Blume, headnote to C.11.54(53.) Blume mentions C.11.56.1 too as a regulation that was 
directed at the difficulties in tax collection caused by transfer of property to powerful patrons. See 
also C.10.19.8, which refers to this kind of land ownership.  
163 Wacke 1980, p. 604.  
164 C.11.54.2. See also Blume’s note here.  
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people.165 There was also one that stressed that only witnesses could be used that 
were in the position to “place their judicial oath above every favour and influence,”166 
thus inhibiting potentiores to put witnesses under pressure.167 Moreover, the power 
of potentiores was apparently so big that judges had to be legally forced not to seek 
shelter in the houses of influential men right after they had finished the fulfilment 
of their duties and to stay for fifty more days in the town where they had been 
appointed, meaning that complaints against him could be heard and sorted.168  
At the same time potentiores themselves tried to stay out of court as much as 
possible when they were involved in lawsuits. This led to measures that obliged 
them to at least appear in court in criminal cases,169 and to the statement that if 
their procurators were to appear in court for them these were to refrain from 
unlawful behaviour.170 
 
Next to the provisions from earlier times that deal with these issues Justinian tried 
to act against abuse of the potentiores’ power by constituting his own regulations. 
In 535 he issued Novel 17, C. 15 as part of a collection of general instructions in 
the form imperial orders to the governors of provinces. It declares:  
 
N.17, C.15: “You will threaten persons who undertake to put up their signs and their names on lands and 
on workshops in cities that do not belong to them, with the danger that if they do so, they will forfeit their 
property to the fisc. For if a man attempts to seize property that belongs solely to the state and to the fisc, he 
will pay the penalty therefor with his own property, and the public signs put thereon will be an example to 
others that they will be subject to the same penalty if they commit like acts. (...)”  
 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
165 C.2.13.1 & 2.  
166 C.4.20.5. 
167 Wacke 1980, p. 583.  
168 C.1.49.1.1. 
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170 C.1.40.11. See also Wacke 1980, p. 584.  
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Here too the deliberate attachment of wrong names on property which in this 
case belongs to the state and fisc is penalized, and there are a more novels 
directed at officials in certain areas which in fact reinforce C.2.14(15).1 by stating 
that these officials should act against the abuse of placards with other people’s 
names, “which frequently happens,”171 and which also make clear that it is these 
governors’ duty to abstain from self-enrichment and to bear in mind the interest 
of the fisc. Apparently this problem was reoccurring and Justinian tried 
repeatedly to extinguish it. In these regulations Justinian also connects the 
criminalisation of this practice with his role as bringer of justice and peace to his 
people, emphasizing that he takes “great care to look after their well-being.”172  
 
But there were more ways than the sanctioning through laws in which the 
emperor acted. As the Digest shows, there was a general responsibility for the 
proconsul (provincial governor) to look after the interests of those whose position 
in court could be impaired by stronger parties, and the countering of oppression 
was also provided for: “if someone should represent himself as being unable to find an 
advocate because of his opponent's power, it is just as much incumbent on the proconsul to 
give him one. But it is wrong for anyone to be oppressed by the sheer power of his opponent; 
in fact, it tends to harm the reputation of the person who has charge of the province, if 
someone gets away with such overpowering behaviour that everyone is afraid to take 
instructions as an advocate against him.173 It was thus also in the interest of a 
proconsul’s reputation to against such practices.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
171 N.28, C.5, which is directed at “The Moderator of Hellespontus.,” N.29, C.4, “concerning the 
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this.  
172 N.164, C.1.  
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Another way was the institution of defensores plebis, introduced by Valentian I in 
367: persons of high official standing were to be selected by the praetorian 
prefects to act against fiscal extortion and the oppression by the powerful. This 
office however proved not to be successful in protecting the weaker groups 
(amongst whom were counted the plebs and decuriones) as the appointed defensores 
often abused their power themselves. Over time, the office also lost the authority 
that it needed in order to be effective.174 And even though it was “one of the duties 
of the provincial governor to see that powerful men do not inflict injuries on the weak or 
their defenders persecute the innocent with false accusations,”175 as is stated in the 
Digest, the potentiores proved to make this so difficult for the provincial governors 
that Constantine in 328 decided that the emperor should be addressed personally 
if a governor found himself unable to persecute such a perpetrating potentior, “so 
that means may be taken as to how to protect the public interest and the injured common 
people.”176  
 
Conclusion 
It can thus be deducted from the above that the law was concerned with the abuse 
of power of influential people, especially where it concerned their behaviour 
towards weaker people in court. Just as well, the law sanctioned the abuse of the 
power of influential people by those seeking their protection. An interesting 
category of citizens comes up as a threat here, which is that of the potentiores. 
These people had acquired their power regardless of their social rank, and the 
imperial office was concerned with several forms of abuse of this power that they 
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175 D.1.18.6.2. 
176 C.1.40.2, which was originally C.Th.1.16.4 – see Dillon 2012, p. 196.  
	   52	  
committed, which was once again committed both by the potentiores themselves 
and by those seeking their protection. The potentiores thus threatened the position 
of weaker groups who could feel powerless against them in society and especially 
in court. They had however obtained so much power that it was also in the 
interest of the organization of the very empire itself to limit it with the help of the 
law, which was in this case the Corpus, though examples from the Codex 
Theodosianus have also been given. 
It can thus be concluded that the biggest threat to the emperor’s claim of his 
commitment to providing access to justice to all subjects through the law was 
allegedly the overwhelming power these influential groups had against weaker 
parties, and also the fact that these elite members managed to escape, undo, and 
subvert the provision of justice by the imperial bureaucracy. 
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Conclusion 
 
The following concluding remarks can be made in response to the notion of the 
centrality of the citizen as phrased by Harries and Humfress in the introduction of 
this paper. Justinian expressed that his codification was a gift to all the people 
and that it was to serve the common good. One of the ways in which this was to 
be realized was through the providing of justice to the people by promulgating a  
law that was deemed clear and certain. Justinian took on the initiative to collect 
all the confused and dispersed existing law and mould it into a clear and definite 
whole that could serve this goal. In this way he also positioned himself as an 
emperor and legislator distinct from his predecessors, who had failed to complete 
this task of clarifying the law. Justinian’s commitment to providing justice to the 
people by means of delivering this codification can be derived from different 
characteristics of this body of law, as has been assessed above. One of these 
characteristics is that it was proclaimed to be the exclusive source of the law that 
could settle all disputes. 
These observations indeed seem to support the centrality of the citizen in at least 
the intention that was articulated in Justinian’s code to provide the people with 
justice through a new body of law. It can also easily be agreed on that the rescript 
system, whose relevant imperial responses were codified in the Corpus, did 
indeed serve the poorer citizens in their seeking to know what the law was, as far 
as the petitions sent to the emperor were indeed answered. When looking at the 
intentions expressed in Justinian’s code, and considering the fact that this 
codification provided people an instrument to invoke justice with, one could thus 
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claim convincingly that Justinian supported this view of the citizen as the focal 
point of the law.  
It has also been shown in the above that great differences in power existed in this 
hierarchical late antique society, and that the law played a role in asserting which 
and how such differences in power were to be upheld. Justinian’s code did 
indeed, in accordance with the people’s interest it claimed to serve, sanction the 
ample kinds of abuse of such power that had come up, both committed by those 
whom power was attributed to and by those who had sought to abuse other 
people’s power by means of – often necessary – protection. One could argue that 
these circumstances too support this view of the centrality of the citizen, as they 
help him to fight different kinds of abuse of power.  
 
But there was an other interest at stake in such penalizing of power abuse, which 
was the interest of the emperor and his imperial bureaucracy in their aiming to 
maintain their own power and legally protect the attributed power of the officials 
that supported them. This interest was served by the differentiated kind of justice 
that the emperor was after, as it corresponded with the social hierarchy: it kept 
the powerful in power and those of less influential status weak. For the use of the 
kind of power that one derived from his social rank was not seen as unfair, but 
providing people within the same category with different kinds of justice in fact 
was. The law was to be invoked by those who felt like such a wrong was inflicted 
on them, and it would state that those belonging to a certain group all had to be 
treated in the way the law defined it.  
For this reason an addition should be made to the idea of the centrality of the 
citizen, which would be that Justinian’s codification recognized and rather 
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amplified the big difference in status and power and that it rendered every rank its 
own kind of justice. Did the law then really serve ‘all the people’ or ‘the common 
good’? The law certainly did not try to release a poor man from his disadvantaged 
position against his rich opponent in court by giving him tools to overcome such 
difference in affluence in the courtroom. It only acknowledged the difference in 
power between them and also that abuse of this power would be sanctioned if the 
law was invoked, thus granting the poorer party a certain protection against his 
opponent – though most disadvantaged people never made their way to court in 
the first place, for financial or other reasons.  
Justinian thus seems to have had his own interest in upholding the law. This 
becomes even clearer when it comes to identifying the most severe threat to his 
proclaimed providing of justice. This threat came from outside the strict social 
structure with the undesirable rise of the potentiores, who were so powerful that 
they would not hesitate to ignore and manipulate the legal system. The potentiores 
had acquired their affluence and local authority independently and thus possessed 
a great deal of power without being obliged to loyalty to the supplier of this 
power (the imperial office) or having to fulfill the duties that came with it. They 
were thus insensitive to the social hierarchy that assigned each citizen his status, 
and often managed to manifest a very strong influence in certain – remote – areas 
of the empire, hence placing interesting challenges for the upholding of the 
imperial law.  
It can thus be learned from this study of Justinian’s codification that its aim to 
serve the common good did not try to solve the social inequality that was the root 
of much of people’s sorrow and legal disputes. The law rather sought to establish 
the dominant power structure even more firmly in its striving to abandon the 
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power of people like the potentiores. It was very much a tool for the emperor to 
maintain the social hierarchy, and with that, his reign. Though the focus has here 
been on Justinian’s code, it can be derived from this source that his predecessors 
dealt with the threat of the potentiores too, as much of the legislation in the Corpus 
(mainly in the Codex and Digest) used in this context dates from earlier times. 
Justinian maintained these old provisions and reinforced them with his Novellae. 
This study of the commitment to the providing of justice under Justinian’s code 
can thus be said to at some extent present us with an image of how the 
stratification of society was upheld by the law in late antiquity. 
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